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Abstract
The problem of optimal government debt is analysed in a two-period model with
optimizing private agents and a distortionary labour tax. The economic role of
government debt is to shift tax distortions over time. The role for debt
policy is strengthened if the government treats future generations differently
or if account is taken of public investment. Government policy may be time-
inconsistent, which calls for the introduction of a credibility constraint.
The consequences for deficit financing are shown by comparing the open-loop
and the feedback Stackelberg solutions in a model with asymmetric preferences.
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1. Introduction
In the 1980's government budget deficits have been exceptionally large in a
number of Western countries. This raises the question if and to what extent
these deficits have had a negative effect on economic welfare. In Romer (1988)
this question is discussed from various perspectives. One way to deal with the
problem is to consider the impact of distortionary taxation assuming that
lump-sum taxes are not available as an instrument of economic policy. Large
deficits today call for some action in the future to warrant government's
solvency. If a cut in government spending is undesirable and seignioriage
revenues are excluded an increase in future taxation will be necessary to
stabilize government debt. In such a case the time profile of taxes may not be
optimal and the costs of extensive deficits can be estimated by specifying a
"cost-function" of raising tax revenue.
Instead of discussing the costs of exceptional deficits one could pose the
problem of the optimal amount of debt right away. This is the approach taken
in a seminal paper by Barro (1979), where the distortionary effects of
taxation and the costs of collecting taxes are approximated by a reduced form
equation. To obtain quantitave estimates on a macro-economic level this seems
the proper route to follow. However, to get a more elaborate picture of the
factors determing optimal debt it is desirable to start from microfoundations.
The debt issue can then directly be related to the theory of optimal taxation
in dynamic macroeconomic models (e.g. Turnovsky and Brock (1980), Lucas and
Stokey (1983), Rogers (1987), Chang (1988), Hillier (1989), Persson and
Tabellini (1990)).
In models with different generations living at the same moment in time
there is a role for government debt even if lump sum taxation is practicable.
This holds for overlapping generations models (e.g. Diamond (1965), Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1980, Ch. 8)) as well as for models with finitely-lived agents
discussed in Blanchard (1985) and analysed more fully in Calvo and Obstfeld
(1988). Here we abstract from these questions by pre-supposing infinitely-
lived households or a society with finitely-lived but nonoverlapping
generations. Instead, the paper focusses on the role of government lending and
borrowing in a macroeconomic model with a distortionary tax on labour income.
It is convenient to cast the analysis in terms of a two-period model, where
the second period can be seen as representing the entire future. The economic2
role of public debt in such a model is to shift tax distortions over time.
Under well specified conditions this policy implies tax smoothing (uniform
tariff across periods). The familiar case of tax smoothing will used as a
benchmark to analyse the role of government debt in some special but not
unimportant situations. More specifically, attention will be paid to optimal
public debt when government spending is productive instead of exhaustive.
Moreover, we will consider optimal tax policy tax policy in case the
government treats present and future generations alike, while the private
sector discounts future consumption of goods and leisure. As will be shown,
tax smoothing is not optimal in these cases for purely economic reasons.
Political aspects of public debt as discussed in Persson and Svensson (1989)
and Alesina and Tabellini (198~) are not taken into account.
Even with a tax on wage income only government policy may be time-
inconsistent as shown in Rogers (198~) and Persson and Tabellini (1990). Under
these circumstances the introduction of a credibility constraint to attain
time-consistency may have consequences for debt policy. Credibility may be
another reason to deviate from a policy of tax smoothing. A discussion of the
problem of time consistency is therefore appropriate to get a proper un-
derstanding of the economic factors which may determine public debt.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model
and formulate the conditions for tax-smoothing and its implications for debt.
Applying a specification of the model analytical solutions for the cases
mentioned above are derived in Section 3. Time-inconsistency is eliminated in
Sections 2 and 3 by assuming that government spending is exogenous for the
time being. As a consequence the government has no possibility to cheat con-
sumers in the second period The issue of time-consistency and debt is
discussed in Section 4 using a different specification of the basic model.
Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the analytical results. The
paper closes with some conclusions.
2. The basic model
Consumers have to decide on consumption and leisure in both periods. They live
for Lwo periods or alternatively they live for one period and care about their3
heirs in the second period. The utility function of a representative agent is
assumed to be linear separable:
u- ul(cl) t vl(,~-,~l) t hl(gl) t ltsCu2(c2) t v2(~-.i2) t h2(s2)], (2.1)
where
ct, ~t, gt denote respectively consumption, labour supply and public
spending in period t, .~ denotes the maximum available time and b denotes the
discount rate. The felicity functions ut, vt and ht are increasing and
concave. For the time being we assume that government expenditure is
exogenous, so that the terms in g can be ignored. The consumer maximizes t
equation (2.1) subject to budget constraints for periods 1 and 2. The
government impose a tax on wage income in both periods. The real wage rate and
the interest rate are given for the individual. Assuming zero initial wealth
and setting the real wage rate equal to one, we may write
cl t s ~ ~1(1-~rl),
c2 ~ ~2(1-~r2) t (itr)s,
(2.2)
(2.3)
where s denotes first period savings, r denotes the interest rate on savings
and ~rt denotes the tax rate in period t. Savings cum interest payments can be
spend in the second period.
Maximization of (2.1) subject to (2.2) and (2.3) results in the first-order
conditions (assuming an interior solution):
ui(cl) ltr
u2(c2) - 1}S, (2.4)
vi(~-~1) - (1-T1)ui(cl), (2.5)
v2(~-~i2) - (1-~2)u2(c2), (2.6)4
where first derivatives are indicated by a prime. Equation (2.4) states that
the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption
equals the real interest rate. Equation (2.5) and (2.6) specify the leisure-
consumption trade-off in each period. Equations (2.4)-(2.6) together with the
budget constraints (2.2) and (2.3) can be solved for cl,
c2, ~1, ~2 and s.
The real wage rate and the interest rate are determined in factor markets
by equating supply and demand. Aggregate labour supply and aggregate savings
follow by summing over individuals. Labour demand and demand for (financial)
capital follow from the profit maximizing behaviour of firms. The problem can
be solved in an elegant way by postulating a linear technology in labour and
capital
f(kt,~t) - ~ktt n~t, t-1,2. (2.7)
Equation (2.7) implies that marginal products are constant, so that factor
demands are completely elastic. The real wage rate equals w-n, which is set
equal to unity for convenience. For the gross return t~ capital we can write
ltr-~.
The government supplies the public consumption good in both periods.
Expenditure in the first period can be financed by taxing labour income or by
issuing government bonds, which are perfect substitutes for financial assets
issued by the private sector. In the second period the government has to raise
taxes to pay for second period expenditure on goods and servicing debt
incurred in the first period. It is assumed that the government always honours
its debt. The alternative of financing a deficit by printing money is not
taken into accountl. The government's budget constraints can now be written as
gl ~ ~1~1 } b, (2.8)
g2t (ltr)b ~ ~2T2, (2.9)
-------------------------------------------------------
1) The consequences of financing the government deficit by money growth in a
model of optimal taxation are discussed in Turnovsky and Brock (1980),
Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987).5
where b denotes the level of government debt2. It should be recalled that
public spending is assumed to be exogenous. This assumption is relaxed in
Section 4. The government maximizes the welfare of its citizens, but may apply
a different discount rate (~). As observed by Ramsey it may be rational not to
discount future streams of goods and leisure. The consequences of such a
behaviour for debt are analysed in Section 3. In maximizing the common good
the government behaves as a leader in a Stackelberg game with atomistic beha-
ving consumers as followers. It announces the optimal tax rate whereupon the
private sector chooses the time-paths of consumption and leisure. The reac-
tions of the private sector are taken into account by the government in deter-
mining the optimal tax rate on labour income. Moreover, the government must
satisfy its budget constraints (2.8) and (2.9).
As is well-known government borrowing may be applied to smooth tax distor-
tions over time. However, it is difficult to characterise the solution of the
problem of optimal taxation in general terms. To clarify this issue the
special case of tax smoothing ~r1-~r2 may serve as a benchmark for further
discussion. As appears from equations (2.4)-(2.6) tax smoothing is optimal if
the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) the discount rate of the
government and the private sector should be the same (~-b); (2) the private
discount rate should be equal to the rate of interest (ó-r); (3) the felicity
functions for leisure should be equal across periods (v1-v2). It should be
noticed that it is not necessary to assume that consumption is smoothed over
time (c1-c2). Che latter result obtains if the felicity function for the
consumption of goods are concave and equal across periods (u1-u2).
Under conditions (1)-(3) the marginal trade-off between leisure and con-
sumption is the same in both periods. It is then optimal for the government to
impose equal tax rates (T1-T2, so that ~1-.~2). The optimal amount of debt can
then be derived from equation (2.8) and (2.9) (with equality sign):
-------------------------------------------------------
2) Summation of the budget constraints of consumers and the government in both
periods yields the resource constraint cltgltk-~1 and
c2}g2-~2}~lc assuming
s-ktb. As both financial assets give the same rate of return consumers are
indifferent with respect to holding private and public debt.6
b - 21tgr - gl - gP, (2.10)
8
where
gP-(gl}ltr)(2tr) is the permanent level of government spending. Debt
policy should be aimed at smoothing peaks and troughs in government spending
(e.g. Barro (1979)). In the next section we shall present explicit solutions
for some situations in which it is not optimal to smooth tax rates.
3. Optimal debt: some special cases
The special cases considered in this section relate to government investment
(productive spending) and to a divergence between private and public discount
rates. To obtain tractable results the felicity functions have to be
specified. This will be done in such a way that the conditions for tax
smoothing will be fulfilled. As observed in section 2 tax smoothing may be
used as a benchmark in discussing more complex cases of optimal taxation. In
section 3.1 the benchmark model will be specified. Government spending is
assumed exogenous and exhaustive. The consequences of productive government
spending are discussed in section 3.2. In section 3.3 it i s assumed that the
government behaves in a non-Pigouvian way by treating present and future
generations on the same footing (the egalitarian society). The analytical
results obtained are illustrated by presenting a numerical example in section
3.4.
3.1 The benchmark model
It is convenient to work with a linear felicity function for consumption of
goods u(ct)-ct for t-1,2. To avoid corner solutions we further assume that the
private discount rate equals the rate of interest (b-r). The felicity function
for leisure is given by v(.~-~t) - a.~n(~i-,~t), t-1,2. As can be easily checked
the conditions for tax smoothing are fulfilled in this case. Moreover, con-
sumers are indifferent with respect to present and future consumption, so that
savings can be set equal to public borrowing: s- b.7
Substitution of these assumptions into equation ( 2.1) gives:
U- cl f a.~n(,~-~1) t 1}S(c2 t a.~n(~-~2)). (3.1)
Maximization of equation (3.1) subject to the budget constraints (2.2) and
(2.3) and assuming a-1 for convenience yields
cl - ~1(1-T1) - b,









Substitution of these results into equation (3.1) taking acount of a-1 gives
the indirect utility function
V - -~1 f ,~n ( ~-,~1) t 1 } S[ -~2 t .in( ~-~2 ) ] .
( ~-~Cl ) ( ~C-~C2 )
(3.6)
The government maximizes V subject to the budget constraints (2.8) and (2.9)
which can be written as:
g1- ~1[1 - -1 ] t b,
(.~-,~i )




The first order conditions for a maximum of V with respect to ~1. ~i2 and b
are:8
~1 t ~1( ( ,~-,~1) 2-,i) - o,
lts~2 t ~2( ( ,~-.~2)2-.~) - 0,




where al and a2 denote the Lagrange-multipliers associated with the government
budget constraints (3.~) and (3.8). Substitution of equation (3.11) in
equation (3.10), taking account of the assumption á- r, result in:
,i2 t ~1( ( .~-.~2 ) 2-.~) - 0 (3.12)
As appears from equations (3.9) and (3.12) the supply of labour is equal
across periods, this result is obtained by imposing uniform tax rates over
time: T1- ~r2. The optimal amount of government debt follows from equation
(2.10).
3.2. Productive government spending
The government has to invest in social overhead capital to keep the economy
going. As discussed in Arrow and Kurz (1970) some forms of social overhead may
yield direct utility. In other cases government capital may enhance produc-
tivity and therefore consumption in an indirect way. The latter aspect is also
analysed in the seminal work by Arrow and Kurz, but here we do not take it
into account. In line with the two-period model it is assumed that government
capital fully depreciates after having been used in the second period. If
there is no initial social overhead capital we can equate the stock of capital
available at the beginning of the second period with the amount of government
investment in the first period which is denoted by gl. In our model social
overhead capital is supposed to diminish the disutility of labour, because it
improves the environment in which people have to work. This idea is captured
by the preference function:9
U - c 1 t ~n ( ~-,~1) t 1 } S[ c2 t g~in ( ~-,~2 ) ] .
1
(3.~3)
Government spending is agian an exogenous variable in the model. To realize
the intended effects we assume gl ~ 1.
There is a Pigouvian government, which maximizes equation (3.13) subject to
the government budget constraints and the behavioural equations of economic
agents. The first order conditions for this case read:
.tl t ~1( (.i-,~l ) 2-.~) - 0,
1 } S,e2 t ~2 ( g( ~-,t2 ) 2-,e ) - o ,
1
1}~ - i t ~i - (ltr)~2- 0,
g1- .~iCi - -1 ] t b,
(,t-,~l)
gl (1}r)b - ~2[1 - - ].
(,~-,~2 )






Proposition: It is optimal to impose a higher tax rate in the second period
compared with that in the first period (T1~ T2). Labour supply will never-
theless be larger in the second period (~1~ .~2) and government borrowing
exceeds the level which is optimal in case of exhaustive expenditure
g
(b ~ 2tr).
Proof. From equations (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) we get
( )2
~- ~-~1 -~ ~ 1 if ( ,~-~i ) 2~ g(,~-,~2 ) 2. The latter equation holds for
2 g ( ~-~2 ) 2-.~ 1
110
~1C ~2 and gl) 1. From the first order conditions of consumer behaviour we
T1 1-1~(~-~1) - 1 -
have: 22 - - C 1 if (~-~1) ~ gl(~-~2), which also holds for ~1C
1-gl~(~-~2)
~2 and gl~ 1. Combining both results we may write
~2~2~ ~1~1, so that ,
~2(1 - -gl ) ~ ~1(1 - -1 ). Applying equation ( 3.18) we can state
(~-~2) (~-~1)
(1tr)b ~ ~1(1 - -1 ), which together with equation (3.1~) yields
(~-~1)
gl
(ltr)b ~ gl-b ~ b ~ 2}r. q.e.d.
If there is only non-productive government expenditure in period 1 optimal
g
debt equals b- 2}r as appears from formula (2.10) and it is optimal to smooth
tax rates. In the case that government spending is productive a larger amount
should be borrowed, because it is optimal to impose a higher tax rate in the
second period. To put it differently, the work-leisure margin in the second
period shifts in favour of work. The second period tax rate is therefore less
distortionary and can be increased vis à vis the first period tax rate. Total
tax receipts will nevertheless be higher in the second period than under tax
smoothing, and so will be the optimal amount of government debt.
3.3. The egalitarian society
The government discount rate is set to zero (~ - 0), while the private dis-
count rate is assumed to be positive (ó ~ 0). In this case one could speak of
an egalitarian society, because the government treats present and future
generations alike. The second period optimality conditions can in this case be
written as:
~2 t ~2((~-~2)2-~) - o, (3.19)11
~2-1}r(~itr),




The first period optimum corresponds to equations (3.7) and (3.9). From these
conditions the following proposition can be derived
Proposition. It is optimal to tax labour in the first period more heavily
(~1~ ~2}, so that relatively more labour is supplied in the second period (~1~
.~2). Even with uniform government expenditure across periods (g1-g2) tax
smoothing is not optimal in this case and the government retires debt or lends
from the public (b ~ 0).
Proof. We first show al~l, so that ~1~ ~2 from equation (3.20). Equation (3.9)
can be written as ~1- ~1,(~-(~-~1)2)-(~-11~ )~(~-(11T )2) ~ 1 for (1-~1)~1.
1 1
Dividing equations (3.9) and (3.19) gives:
.~1 ~1 ( .~-~1) 2-.Z .~1 al (,~-.Zl ) 2-~
~ - . - -. If ~ ~ 1 and ~ ~ 1 then we must have - - ~ 1.
2
~2 (,~-.~2 ) 2-.~ 2 2 ( ~-,~2 ) 2-,~
Notice that the nominator and denominator are both negative so that this
condition can be reformulated as (~-~1)2~(~-~2)2. However, this can only be
true if ~1~ ~2. With Tl~~r2 and R1~ ~2 we have
T1~1~~2~2
because optimal tax
rates lie on the rising branch of the Laffer curve. From equations (3.9) and
(3.12) it can be derived that this rising branch is characterised by
(R-,~t)2~ ~(t-1,2). For g1-g2 we now get bC0 as follows directly from
equations (2.8) and (2.9). q.e.d.
The government has a lower discount rate than the private sector and therefore
raises aggregate savings in favour of future generations. The additional12
savings must come from the government sector (b ~ 0), which taxes the younger
generation more heavily than the older one (~r1~T2). Optimal taxation is now
not only a matter of minimizing the excess burden, but also of inter-
generational welfare. These objectives are to be traded off in an optimal
manner. An alternative way to describe this trade off between objectives is to
argue in terms of the marginal cost of public fonds, which are reflected in
the present value of the Lagrange multipliers ( e.g. Persson and Tabellini
(1990)). The marginal cost of public funds is higher in the second period
a
(~2~itr),
so that it is optimal to have a higher tax rate in the first period.
3.4. A numerical example
The analytical results obtained are illustrated by numerical examples
presented in Table 1. The examples are based on the following parameter values
and exogenous variables:
Benchmark model : ~C-10, r-b-~-0.5, g1-2, g2-0.
Productive spending: ~-10, r-á-~-0.5, g1-2, g2-0.
Egalitarian society: ~-10, r-b-0.5, ~-0, g1-2, g2-0.
[insert Table 1]
In the benchmark model there is tax smoothing and the amount of government
debt (b) corresponds to formula (2.10). Exhaustive public spending crowds out
private consumption in period 1, so that private savings match the public
deficit. With productive government expenditure the tax rate in the second
period (~r2) is higher, while the first period rate (tl) is lower compared with
the benchmark. The lower tax rate in the first period allows the government to
raise the amount of borrowing from the private sector. In the second period
consumption (c2) is higher despite a higher tariff on wage income. In the
egalitarian society the tax rate in the first period is higher than in the
f13
second period. The lower tax rate in the second period allows a higher con-
sumption level (c2) than that in the first period. Public debt is lower than
in the benchmark model because the government forsters aggregate savings. With
uniform government expenditure across periods (g1-g2-2) there would be a
surplus (b--0.179).
A strict welfare comparison of the cases considered is not possible,
because the social welfare function differs across the examples presented.
However, the result with respect to V are plausible. With productive
government spending social welfare is higher than with pure exhaustive spen-
ding. In the egalitarian society social welfare is higher than in the
benchmark model, as a result of the lower public discount rate, which
dominates the negative welfare effect of a change in private spending.
4. Time-inconsistency and debt
If government expenditure is taken into account as an endogenous variable the
government has two instruments in the second period. Once this period has been
arrived it may then be optimal to change the optimal plan with respect to
these instruments. The government may surprise or cheat consumers, so that
economic policy is time-inconsistent. In a case of wage taxation cheating may
be preferable if the consumption-leisure margin ex-post differs from this
margin ex-ante. It is always possible to eliminate the cheating option by a
suitable choice of tax instruments. In the terminology of game theory such an
escape route is called a feedback Stackelberg solution. However, there is a
price to be paid for consistency. A feedback Stackelberg solution usually
yields a lower welfare level than an ex-ante solution or open-loop Stackelberg
solution (e.g. Fischer (1980), Rogers (1987))3. It may be interesting to
analyse the consequences of time-consistency for government debt policy.
Unfortunately the problem cannot be solved in general terms, so that we must
rely on a (numerical) example.
3) However see for a counter-example Van der Ploeg and De Zeeuw (1989).14
Following s suggestion by Persson and Tabellini (1990, Ch. 8) we introduce
the following assumptions: ul(ci)-ci, u2(c2)-.~n(c2), vl(~-.~1)-~n(~-~1),
v2(~-~2)-~n(~-~2), h2(g2)-~n(g2), g1-0 and ó-0. The utility function of the
representative individual can then be expressed as:
U - cl t ,~n (,~-,~1) t ~n ( c2 ) f ,in( ~-,~2 ) t ~n ( g2 ) . (4.1)
Consumers maximize U with respect to cl, c2, .~1 and ~2 subject to their budget
constraints. Asssuming r-0 the intertemporal budget constraint can be written
as
clt c2- (1-~rl).~lt (1-~c2)~2. (4.2)
It should be noticed that the conditions for tax smoothing are fulfilled in
this case. From the first order conditions for a maximum of U subject to










It is assumed that ci is always positive. Substitution of equations (4.3) -
(4.6) in equation (4.1) gives the indirect utility function:
v - (2-~r1-~r2).~ - 3 t .~n(il~ ) t ~n(il~ ) t ~n(g2). (4-7)
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The government maximizes V with respect to tl, ~c2 and g2 subject to the inter-
temporal budget constraint:
g2- 21~1} ~2~2. (4.8)
First period government expenditure is set equal to zero, because it is ines-
sential for the problem of time-inconsistency. The first order conditions for
a maximum of V are






~1 - 2) - p~
(1-T1)





where ~ denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget
constraint (4.8). Equations (4.8) -(4.11) can be solved for
T1, ~2, g2 and ~.
As appears from (4.9) and (4.10) it is indeed optimal to smooth taxes
(t1-~2).
Moreover, it should be noted that government debt is negative (b
--T1~1)'
because taxes are raised in the first period, while government spending is
zero in this period.
In the second period when the decisions made in period 1 belong to the past
the consumers' problem can be specified as
max. U2 - Rn(c2) } ~n(~-R2) t ~n(g2),
{c2,,~2}
(4.12)
subject to c2-(1-T2)~C2ts. (4,13)16
Savings ( s) are invested in private or public bonds as shown in equation
(2.12). Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with budget constraint
(4.13) by u2 the first order conditions can be written as
-1 - u2(1-T2).
~-~2
Solving equations (4.13)-(4.15) for c2 and ~2 yields
c2- 2[(1-~r2)~}s],






It should be observed that equation (4.16) and (4.17) are equivalent to
equations (4.4) and (4.6) if ~r2 is not changed. This can easily be checked.
Savings are defined as s-(1-~rl)R1-cl. Substitution of equation (4.3) and (4.5)
results in
s- 2 - (1-~r2),~. (4.18)
If this outcome is substituted in equations (4.16) and (4.17) we get the
second period consumption level and labour supply as shown in respectively
equations (4.4) and (4.6). However, there is no reason to assume that T2
remains the same, because the government can take advantage of the situation.
The effects of a rise in the second period tax rate on the supply of labour
differ in the ex-ante situation from that in the ex-post situation as can be
[insert Figure 1]deduced from equations (4.6) and (4.15). There is no reason to suppose that
the ex-post Lagrange multiplier u2 is equal to unity. To put it differently,
the income effects of a change in the price of leisure are unequal in both
cases considered as shown in Figure 1. The initial equilibrium is given in
point A, where the marginal substitution ratio between second period con-
sumption and second period leisure equals the price of leisure, which is equal
to (1-~2) in the present example. An increase in t2 implies a downward
rotation of the budget line and the new equilibrium will be at point B in the
ex-post situation. The change in ~2 is the result of a positive substitution
effect and a negative income effect with respect to leisure. Consumption
always declines if both goods are normal because the substitution and income
effects are then both negative. In the ex-ante situation this will lead to a
rise in capital accumulation because the rate of time-preference now falls
below the interest rate4. An increase in non-human wealth shifts the second
period budget line upwards as indicated by the vertical arrow in Figure 1. The
new equilibrium in the ex-ante situation is at point B with c2 unchanged as
required by equation (4.4). The negative income effect with respect to leisure
is more than compensated, so that labour supply falls by a smaller amount than
in the ex-post situation. The distortionary effect of change in T2 is
therefore lower ex-post and the government has an incentive to surprise con-
sumers by raising the wage tax in the second period. In the ex-post situation
investment decisions are bygones and the individual is unable to rearrange the
consumption profile.
Consumers will be aware of the opportunities the government has to cheat
them in the second period. A credible tax strategy requires an elimination of
the surprise incentive. This can be done by constructing a feedback solution
in the following way. First, the government solves the second period problem
for given (first period) consumers' savings
-------------------------------------------------------
4) The rate of time-prefence is equal to: -dc2~dc1-1-u1(cl)~u2(c2)-1-c2-1.18
Max. V2- ,in[2{(1-T2),~ts}] t ,~n[Z{~-ls~ }] t .~n(82) (4.19)
{~r2,g2} 2
subject to the budget constraint
T2[2{~-ls~ }] - b t g2.
2







- ~ } s 2- } ~2C2 - 2(1s~2) - 2 1?~C 2]
- o, (4.22)
~(1-~r2)ts (1-T2)s-(1-~r2) ~ ( 2)
where y2 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget
constraint (4.20). Second, given the optimal choice of ~2 and g2 the
government solves the problem:
Max. V - ( 2-~r -~c ),i-3 t ~nC 1 ],
{ } 1 2 1 ~1 ~1




Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget
constraint (4.24) by yl. The first order condition can be written as:
~
-,i t 11~1 t vl (.t - 1121 - 1 2) - 0.
(1-T1)
(4.25)19
Third, decisions should be made in a consistent way, so that total utility V
- Vlt V2 is maximized. This requires that the government satisfies its inter-
temporal budget constraint, which implies v1-v2-v. The model now consists of
equations (4.18), (4.20), (4.21), (4.22), (4.24) and (4.25) and solves for the
endogenous variables ~1, ~2, g, b, s and y.
The consistent or feedback solution will have a higher ~2 than the time-
inconsistent or open-loop solution for reasons given above. If so, the first
period tax rate will be lower in the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. As a
consequence the government will save less than in the open-loop solution. Tax
distortions are shifted towards the second period to gain credibility. As a
result social welfare will be lower. The shift towards taxation in the future
raises the potential for government borrowing.
It may be useful to illustrate these results numerically. The outcomes for
the different solution concepts discussed in this section are presented in
Table 2. Calculations are based on a parameter value ~-3, so that corner
solutions are avoided. Initial non-human wealth is assumed to be zero.
[insert Table 2]
The open-loop solution shows tax rate smoothing and a reduction of government
debt. As appears from the last column in Table 2 it is preferable from a
welfare point of view to surprise consumers in the second period by raising
the tax rate and government spending at the expense of private consumption.
The negative effect on second period leisure is small, which corroborates our
earlier conclusion. Time-consistency has its price in terms of welfare as
appears from the feedback solution. The second period tax rate on wages is now
even higher than under cheating. This can be explained by the lower tax rate
in period 1, which raises debt service in period 2. However, because the
relatively high distortionary impact in the second period compared with the
cheating solution the tax rate T2 must be high to generate sufficient revenue
to pay for all government outlays. Finally, it should be noted that c2 is
equal to unity in the feedback solution, because the rate of time preference
must be equal to the rate of interest.20
5. Conclusions
If preferences are symmetric across periods and the discount rates of the
private and the public sector are equal to the real interest rate it is op-
timal to smooth taxation over time. The optimal amount of debt then depends
on transitory components in government spending and the rate of interest.
These more familiar results change if the symmetry is relaxed. More
specifically, when the government discount rate lies below the private dis-
count rate tax smoothing is no longer optimal. Welfare can then be raised by
increasing aggregate savings, which calls for a shift in taxation from the
future to the present and a reduction in public debt. With productive
government spending things are just the other way around. Public investment
extends the tax base in the future as social overhead capital contributes to
private consumption either directly or indirectly. As a consequence taxes can
be shifted to the future to a certain degree and there is an additional role
for government borrowing.
Asymmetry in the sense defined above is also interesting from another
perspective. Even if there is no tax on non-human wealth, but only a tax on
labour earnings government policy may be time-inconsistent if the symmetry
assumption is given up. Under these circumstances a rational expectations
equilibrium with the government as leader in a Stackelberg game requires the
introduction of a credibility constraint. Comparing the resulting feedback
solution with the time-inconsistent open-loop solution it can be concluded
that taxes have to be shifted to the the future to generate credibility. If
so, there is again an additional role for deficit financing.
Our analysis of public debt points in the direction interesting areas for
future research. Here we will mention two such topics but the list could
easily be supplemented with other examples. First, the impact of public in-
vestment on the economy and on government policies could be given a more
complete treatment along the lines set out in Arrow and Kurz (1970). More
specifically, it might be rewarding to extend their model by introducing
endogenous labour supply. Second, assuming a non-linear technology factor
renumerations would become endogenous. In this case an optimal policy should
take account of the effects of tax and debt instruments on factor incomes.21
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TABLE 1. Optimal debt in the different situations.
Variable Benchmark Productive Egalitarian
Model Spending Society
gl 2.00 2.00 2.00
g2 0.00 0.00 0.00
~1 0.136 0.100 0.152
T2 0.136 0.177 0.112
b o.800 1.109 0.663
~1 8.843 8.889 8.821
~2 8.843 9.392 8.874
cl 6.843 6.889 6.821
c2 8.843 9.392 8.874
v 12.981 13.255 15.982,
023
TABLE 2. Time-inconsistency: an example.
Variable Open-loop Feedback "Cheating"
Stackelberg Stackelberg
Ti o.23 o.i8 0.23
~2 0.23 0.46 0.40
g o.78 0.85 1.09
b -0.39 -0.32 -0.39
~i 1.71 1.78 1.71
~2 1.71 1.16 1.76
ci 1.63 1.09 1.63
c2 1.00 1.00 0.74
v 1.90 1.74 2.19w
Jc2
Fínure 1
12II~IÍ~~~~~~IÍ~NIIVVPI~I